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A genealogical analysis of Peter Arnold’s conceptual account of meaning in 
movement, sport and physical education 
Abstract 
We write as critical theorists who share an interest in how conceptions of physical education 
are taken forward in policy and practice. In this respect, we are particularly intrigued by 
Peter Arnold’s conceptual account and the subsequent ways in which his ideas have informed 
national curriculum ambitions. Despite the prominence of Arnold’s influence, we are 
concerned that there has been an insufficiently rigorous and robust review of his theorising 
to date, particularly in relation to educational-theoretical terms surrounding where his ideas 
originated from. Accordingly, we critically discuss the merits of adopting a genealogical 
approach in order to support a detailed analysis of Arnold’s conceptual account of meaning 
in movement, sport and physical education; one which especially focuses on learning 
“about”, “through” and “in” movement. We conclude by questioning a number of the 
complex strands of Arnold’s work in the expectation that greater clarity and purpose can 
emerge. This it is argued will be beneficial in terms of providing clarity on aim or aims 
statements in physical education, which in turn can secure greater policy coherence and 
practice gains. 
Keywords: Arnold; genealogy; “about”, “through” and “in”; physical education; meaning; 
movement 
Introduction 
Peter Arnold’s (1979a, 1979b, 1985, 1988) work is often held-up as the “gold-standard” in 
physical education and sport pedagogy curriculum design, particularly in countries like 
Australia. For instance, the Physical Education Senior Syllabus (2004, 2010) developed by 
the Queensland Studies Authority (Queensland Curriculum and Assessment Authority as of 
July 2014) borrows heavily from Arnold’s conceptual account of “about”, “through” and “in” 
(see Rationale section). Central to Arnold’s work is the educational implications of the 
concept of movement, particularly the notion of “meaning”. Arnold’s use of the term 
“meaning” is crucial to understanding his work as it provides the foundation of his “three 
dimensions of movement”: Dimension I: education about movement; Dimension II: 
education through movement; and Dimension III: education in movement. These dimensions 
relate to the place of movement within the curriculum of “general education” (see for 
example Arnold, 1979a). The crux of Arnold’s argument for movement as a “subject” within 
the curriculum, is as follows: (1) persons have the capacity to experience a range of different 
modes or kinds of meaning; (2) engaging in certain movement forms involves coming to 
understand personal knowledge (synnoetic realm) in a meaningful way; (3) personally 
meaningful experiences share similarities with other forms of knowledge (aesthetic realm) 
developed in the curriculum like the arts; and, (4) hence, education must include movement 
in the curriculum if it is serious about a well-balanced general education of a person.  
We find it interesting that even though Meaning in Movement, Sport and Physical 
Education was published some thirty or so years ago, Arnold’s three dimensions of 
movement (“about”, “through” and “in”) now underpins the proposed curriculum document 
Shape of the Australian Curriculum: Health and Physical Education (2012) that maps out the 
future direction of the Australian Curriculum for Health and Physical Education from 
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Foundation to Year 10 (F-10). It would appear to be de rigueur to argue in the literature (see 
for example Brown, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Brown & Penney, 2013; Jones et al., 2014) that 
Arnold’s work has been “lost” to the point that it ought to be “re(articulated)” and 
“re(emphasised)” so it is suitable for contemporary physical education (Brown, 2013b) and/or 
viewed as alternative “ways of knowing” (Brown & Penney, 2013). Indeed, a particular issue 
we have at the moment concerns the trend in physical education and sport pedagogy that 
seems to unquestionably accept Arnold’s conceptual account without due consideration to 
how the concept was influenced by history to serve a certain purpose. Of course, one might 
wonder, why is Arnold’s conceptual account of “about”, “through, and “in” of such concern, 
particularly when it is held in such high esteem in the academic domain. In order to explain 
why a concept exists in its present form requires careful attention to past forms and 
transformations from which it emerged. The purpose served by such an undertaking is to 
come to an understanding of the various interpretations and meanings that explain its current 
character. It also suggests that concepts need clarification because they are products of a 
complicated historical development that have been synthesised from a range of diverse ideas 
into one concept that will remain hidden from us until they have been revealed.  
 
This approach raises a number of rather awkward questions, such as: What are the ancestors 
or origins from which Arnold’s work come from? Are the origins of his work based on 
educational principles that are sound? Are Arnold’s ideas in any sense “new” or just 
reconceptualised ideas? We are cognisant that there is a risk that we may be perceived by 
some as being unnecessarily critical and subversive to be asking these questions, however, 
there is merit in analysing Arnold’s conceptual account. These reasons may range from 
coming to understand the origin or origins of Arnold’s work, to shine a light on under 
developed and incoherent ideas, and most importantly to highlight its limitations. 
Consequently, for the purposes of this paper we will critically discuss three issues: firstly, we 
outline why we have adopted a genealogical approach and provide an overall structure of our 
genealogical analysis; secondly, we undertake a genealogical analysis of Arnold’s conceptual 
account of meaning in movement, sport and physical education; and lastly, we piece together 
the strands of Arnold’s work in order to understand the limitations better in the hope that 
something radically new will emerge. 
 
Why a genealogical approach? 
To undertake a genealogy is to map out the ancestors from which an individual or family has 
come from. Our usage derives from Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1887/1998) use of the word 
“genealogy” in his book titled On the Genealogy of Morality. As Nietzsche provides an 
extensive analysis of the concept of morality and a detailed explanation of what he considers 
morality to be (see for example Nietzsche, 1883–1885/1961, 1886/1973, 1887/1998), much 
can be gained from utilising his genealogical framework (Nietzsche, 1887/1998) to analyse 
other concepts of note. According to Nietzsche (1887/1998), to explain why something exists 
would be to trace it back through past forms of its “meaning” from which it appears in its 
present form in order to show how something came to be “interpreted” differently from its 
original point and purpose. If Nietzsche’s approach is correct, then any concept or concepts in 
question will have quite a different meaning from which it emerged due to a series of 
functions imposed on it, to the point that it was “taken over” and reinterpreted by others to 
serve a new purpose. Our point that we wish to emphasise is that a genealogical analysis of 
Arnold’s conceptual account of “about”, “through” and “in” can play an important role in 
conceptual clarification as it can help isolate the core strands that have become so tightly 
intertwined that they seem inseparable. Nietzsche (1887/1998, p. 53; II, §13) in discussing 
the earlier stages of the “synthesis of meanings” argues that concepts will appear:  
... more soluble, also more capable of shifts; one can still perceive in each individual 
case how the elements of the synthesis change their valence and rearrange themselves 
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accordingly, so that now this, now that element comes to the fore and dominates at the 
expense of the remaining ones, indeed in some cases one element ... seems to cancel 
out all the rest of the elements. 
We now offer an overall structure of our genealogical analysis of Arnold’s conceptual 
account of “about”, “through” and “in” that incorporates Nietzsche’s genealogical structure 
of conceptual clarification. Our genealogical analysis of Arnold’s conceptual account has 
identified the intertwining of two major strands, which are his response to two different 
questions. For the point and purpose of our paper we will refer to these as: Genealogy I: the 
ideal of progressivism in education; and, Genealogy II: the person is an embodied being-in-
the-world that derives personal meaning from what he or she does. 
Although, we are cognisant that the actual development of each took place in interaction 
with each other, the point of treating each in isolation is to emphasise that they are separable 
aspects which Arnold’s intertwining makes difficult to fully appreciate. It is important to 
acknowledge that this kind of historical analysis will not make it possible to specify the exact 
point at which Arnold’s ideas came from, but it will give us a means of identifying how 
Arnold’s ideas are a product of a complicated historical development that have been 
interpreted and reinterpreted for quite different purposes today. To see this, however, readers 
need to be willing to piece together the genealogical accounts of the two major strands treated 
separately, but come to understand that it was only through their interaction that Arnold’s 
conceptual account came to be.  
Genealogy I: the ideal of progressivism in education 
In response to traditional (or subject-centred) forms of education which construes knowledge 
in narrowly defined intellectualist terms (Hirst, 1974) and omits practical activities as merely 
“of knack” rather than of understanding (Peters, 1966), Arnold (1979a) set out to explore 
both the concept of movement in relation to education and at the same time argues for its 
inclusion in the curriculum. Borrowing heavily from Phenix (1964) he argues that personal 
knowledge (synnoetic realm) is its own form of knowledge, and as a result just as important 
as Hirst’s (1974) forms of knowledge thesis. It is not until we, however, go back to Arnold’s 
(1968) preceding work entitled Education, Physical Education and Personality Development 
that we get a sense of his initial thoughts on experiential learning which has its origins in 
Dewey’s (1938/1963; 1916/1966) work, particularly Experience and Education. We mention 
this here as Dewey’s work on progressive education (or student-centred) feature in Arnold’s 
work, particularly the notion that dynamic interactions between the body and the mind can 
play an important role in synthesising experiences in activity contexts. Arnold recognised 
Dewey’s notion of the “whole child” approach and the purpose of education as a mechanism 
for transmitting the cultural values of a society through interaction with the group. This is 
evident by a wide ranging focus on the interconnections between the “educational, psycho-
social and bio-philosophic” in building a critique of how physical education relates both to 
the personality development of the child and the wider needs of society (Arnold, 1968, p. 
135).  
 Arnold’s recognition of and interest in Dewey, and other formulators of new theories 
of his time, such as Jesse Feiring Williams (1930, 1951, 1964) who is mostly known for his 
famous statement showing the progression of physical education from a subject concerned 
with education of the physical to one which purported to education through the physical. For 
instance, Williams (1964, p. 8) in the 8th edition of his book entitled The Principles of 
Physical Education writes: 
When mind and body are thought of as two separate entities, physical education was 
obviously an education of the physical; in similar fashion mental education made its 
own exclusive demands. But with new understanding of the nature of the human 
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organism in which wholeness of the individual is the outstanding fact, physical 
education becomes education through the physical.  
Although, not formally acknowledged, Williams learning nomenclature can be found in 
Arnold’s (1968, p. 14) original book, when he argues that physical education has a role to 
play by “educating by, through and of the physical”. This demonstrate that these ideas were 
being considered by Arnold for some years before his later and better known conceptual 
account of education “about”, “through” and “in” movement found its way into Meaning in 
Movement, Sport and Physical Education.  
Genealogy II: the person is an embodied being-in-the-world that derives personal meaning 
from what he or she does 
A central feature of Arnold’s work is the concept of “meaning” as it relates to movement. 
Arnold (1979a) makes it clear from the outset – preface section of his book – that he is 
interested in “what movement means” by looking at “movement as a means of fulfilling ends 
that lie outside itself” through instrumental mediums such as sport (p. xii). He goes on to add 
that it is only when we engage in movement activities do we know what movement means 
from the first-person point of view (“inside”) as opposed to movement understood from a 
scientific point of view (“outside”). Arnold (1979a) makes it clear that it is the former which 
he is concerned with. In order, to make sense of the first-person perspective, Arnold 
undertakes an extensive critique surrounding what it means to be a person by utilising a 
branch of philosophy known as phenomenology and existentialism to make sense of our 
embodiment in the world. Consequently, Arnold’s interpretation of “embodiment” is crucial 
to understanding what he means by “meaning” in movement.  
 
In Chapter 1 (The Person as an Embodied Consciousness) Arnold (1979a) clearly outlines 
that his understanding of “embodiment” has been informed by the philosophical works of 
Marcel (1951/1960), Sartre (1943/1956) and Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962). Arnold makes it 
clear that the benefits of embodiment are important for two reasons: (1) embodiment is both a 
necessary part of our existence and consciousness; and, (2) it is the vehicle or mechanism by 
which we experience the world and crucial to coming to know who I am as an embodied 
“being in the world”. Although, Arnold (1979a) does not credit Heidegger (1927/2010) with 
the use of the term “being-in-the-world” where it originates from, he does use the term freely, 
albeit without the hyphens “being in the world” (see Chapter 1) as a means to highlight that 
our bodies are the vehicles in which we make contact with the world, and hence make-sense 
of it. In general, Arnold argues that meaning is derived from being consciously engaged in 
and doing something that is personally meaningful to the agent in question. Here the 
subjective quality of the movement experience is exploring through a range and complexity 
of “meaningful lived experience” examples found in Chapter 2 (The Phenomenology of 
Action and Meaning) that attempt to emphasise three categories of meanings: (1) primordial; 
(2) contextual; and, (3) existential.  
 
Later, Arnold moves to other formulations of what it means to know something in movement 
as a means to provide epistemic grounds for the place of movement in the curriculum. 
Borrowing heavily from Polanyi (1958, 1961, 1966) Arnold in Chapter 4 (Perceiving and 
Knowing in Movement) argues, that all knowledge is personal knowledge. Using Polanyi’s 
(1966) account of “tacit knowing” and the fact we come to know and understand relies 
heavily on a complex form of internal integration. As a result, Arnold views knowing in 
movement as a form of practical knowledge that can only be understood and learnt from 
doing or being on the “inside”. This knowledge cannot be easily articulated as experiences 
are deeply personal, particularly when someone is being skilful.  
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It is not until the last chapter (Education, Movement and the Curriculum) that Arnold brings 
together his ideas to argue for the place of movement in the curriculum of general education. 
Part of Arnold’s central thesis is an alternative to the traditional-liberal curriculum of Hirst 
(1974). In order to overcome what he sees as a curriculum that disproportionately focuses on 
cognitive development (“intellectualistic terms”) at the expense of other areas of human 
development, Arnold turns to Phenix’s (1964) Realms of Meaning (6 realms of meaning: (1) 
symbolics; (2) empirics; (3) esthetics; (4) synnoetics; (5) ethics; and, (6) synoptics). 
Borrowing from Phenix (see preface section), Arnold (1979a, p. 163) argues that the “... 
development of human beings ... ‘requires education in a variety of realms of meaning rather 
than in a single type of rationality’” which recognises that we highly complex holistic beings. 
Although Arnold does not deny that there are some similarities with Hirst’s forms of 
knowledge thesis and Phenix’s six realms of meaning, however, from the point of view of 
movement as a viable alternative, he notes two differences: (1) aesthetic; and, (2) synnoetic 
realm. According to Arnold, these two realms (aesthetic and synnoetic) accord the most with 
his preceding chapters on the person as an embodied consciousness, particularly the 
synnoetic realm of meaning which share similarities with the subjective quality of movement 
experiences. In the next section, we piece together the strands of Arnold’s work in order to 
understand the limitations better in the hope that something radically new will emerge.  
 
A genealogical analysis of Arnold’s work: piecing together the strands of Arnold’s work in 
order to understand its limitations 
The historical context in which Arnold (1979a) wrote his most influential piece of work is 
crucial to understanding where his ideas came from. For instance, he was teaching at the 
female only teacher education college – Dunfermline College of Physical Education in 
Edinburgh (Scotland) – which was steeped in the traditions of educational gymnastics and 
modern dance. The reason why this is important is due to the fact that he was immersed in the 
female tradition of physical education – which Kirk (2010) refers to as “physical education-
as-gymnastics” – that was quite different to the Scottish School of Physical Education 
(Glasgow, Scotland) which was the men’s College that focused on a scientific-sports-related 
version of physical education, which Kirk (2010) refers to as “physical education-as-sport-
techniques”. According to Kirk (1992, 2006, 2010; Stolz & Kirk, 2015), from the 1950s to 
the 1970s the female version of physical education-as-gymnastics lost out to the male version 
of physical education-as-sports-technique that had a strong scientific and sport-orientated 
focus. Understandably, Arnold might have felt quite marginalised in the British context of 
physical education during this period. Compounding the issue further was a preoccupation 
with justifications for physical education that either, agreed with, adapted justifications to fit 
with, and/or argued against traditional-liberal forms of education (Stolz, 2014). The catalyst 
for this response was in part due to the work of R. S. Peters and P. H. Hirst, whose 
traditional-liberal (or subject centred) form of education excluded physical education from 
the curriculum. Arnold’s initial response to both being marginalised and traditional-liberal 
forms of education can be found in his first book Education, Physical Education and 
Personality Development which has a wide ranging focus on the interconnections between 
the “educational, psycho-social and the bio-philosophic” in building a critique of how 
physical education relates both to the personality development of the child and the wider 
needs of society (Arnold, 1968). This work is rarely mentioned nowadays, but it is worth 
noting for three main reasons. Firstly, the influence of Dewey’s views on experiential 
learning are in evidence with Arnold (1968) outlining, for example, the part that dynamic 
interactions between the body and the mind can play in synthesising experiences in activity 
contexts. It is also important to note, that Dewey’s influence on Arnold’s work is best 
described as superficial which is evident by six author index references to Dewey in Arnold 
(1968), three in Arnold (1979a) and six in Arnold (1988). Secondly, Arnold’s disdain for the 
pernicious influence of examinations is laid bare when he criticises “... their paralysing 
impact, especially amongst the senior forms of our Secondary Schools ...” and argues that 
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those “... aspects of education that are not examined should not be squeezed out of existence” 
such as physical education (Arnold, 1968, p. 7). Ironically, it is in examination contexts (e.g. 
Queensland Physical Education Senior Syllabus) rather than in the non-examined subject 
contexts that Arnold’s work is championed. Thirdly, the learning nomenclature used has 
changed over time. Instead of referring to learning “about”, “through” and “in” movement, 
Arnold (1968, p. 14) starts out with the phrasing “educating by, through and of the physical”, 
which indicate that framework-related ideas were being considered by Arnold for some years 
before his later and better known learning “about”, “through” and “in” explanations began to 
influence policy and practice. According to Kirk (Stolz & Kirk, 2013) in a recent scholarly 
interview1, the usage of the term “education of the physical” was an old idea that came out of 
the physical training literature which was popular in America and is most easily equated with 
the “in” dimension which he extended upon with his interpretation and reinterpretation of 
engaging in movement that is meaningful. The education “through” dimension came about in 
the 1950s, when there was a shift from an education of the physical to an education through 
the physical in physical education as a result of the child-centred movement of the time (Kirk, 
2014). As for the “about” dimension, this is a recent invention that was influenced by the 
development of sport and exercise science in the academicisation of the school curriculum 
(Stolz & Kirk, 2013).  
 
What is of interest to our analysis is how Arnold’s work found its way into Australian 
curriculum documents, particularly Queensland where his work first appeared in the Physical 
Education Pilot Senior Syllabus in the mid-1990s (Queensland Board of Senior Secondary 
School Studies, 1995) followed by iterations in 2004 and 2010 (Queensland Studies 
Authority, 2004, 2010), and now underpins the proposed Australian Curriculum for Health 
and Physical Education (Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2012). 
According to Kirk (Stolz & Kirk, 2013), Arnold’s ideas found their way into the curriculum 
in Queensland (Australia) through two means: firstly, through his book titled Physical 
Education and Curriculum Study; and, secondly the Chair of the State Review Panel 
translated some of these ideas from Kirk’s (1988) book into the Queensland Physical 
Education Senior Syllabus in the mid-1990s that worked pragmatically. It is interesting to 
note that Kirk’s book provided one of the first occasions where Arnold’s (1979a) theorising 
was further contextualised as a framework device that “... may be useful for theorising the 
form and content of physical education in relation to its educational status in schools” (Kirk, 
1988, p. 71). In this relatively brief chapter (Chapter 4), Arnold’s theorising of learning 
“about”, “through” and “in” is the only framework of note which is outlined. Later in the 
chapter, Kirk’s (1988, p. 80) assessment of the merits Arnold’s theorising is more affirming 
when he notes that it needs: 
... to be firmly emphasised that physical education is essentially concerned with 
education “about”, “through”, and “in” movement and it is the study and practice of 
physical activity that renders physical education an indispensable subject in a 
balanced educational programme.  
Although, this would appear to be quite a glowing endorsement of Arnolds work from a well- 
respected academic; however, the problem is that engagements with Arnold’s (1979a) ideas 
seem to have had a rather chequered pattern of development over the last thirty-five years. 
Whilst we agree with Brown (2013b) to a point that Arnold’s work has often informed 
international curriculum developments and has also been variously interpreted and 
misunderstood at times, we also continue to highlight our concern that his claim that Arnold’s 
work “possesses more currency than ‘other’ holistic frameworks or models” (Brown, 2013b, 
p. 23) is highly questionable, both in terms of his lack of specification regarding which 
“other” models he might be referring to, and also in how models are currently being taken 
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forward in physical education. Part of the problem as we see it, concerns a lack of ideas 
within the physical education space in which to work with that has often led to quite 
incoherent ideas, such as Arnold's conceptual account being taken forward uncritically both 
by policy makers – as they continue to be – or tweaked by academics for other purposes for 
their own thinly developed points of view.   
 
This picture of fluctuating engagement reflects the situation more widely in physical 
education. McNamee (1998, 2005), for example, in a thorough review of the nature and 
values of physical education makes no mention of Arnold’s work even though there are 
multiple references to his colleagues – David Carr (1979; 1997) and Andrew Reid (1996a; 
1996b; 1997). Carr (1998) does refer to Arnold in one of his chapter contributions, but not in 
flattering terms. In considering the view that physical education can often essentially mean all 
things to all people, whereby its aesthetic benefits might advance the case for its inclusion 
within arts programmes and the capacity for reflection could ensure that physical education 
ought to be included in science programmes and so on ad infinitum, Carr notes that Arnold 
(1979a) writings represents “a particularly extravagant statement of this view” (Carr, 1998, p. 
129). Furthermore, we would argue that there has also been a distortion of Arnold’s view 
over the years. Most recently this weakness is evident in Jones et al. (2014, p. 5) where the 
authors report that “Arnold was influenced by Heidegger” and of how his existential 
phenomenological account of “being-in-the-world” might connect with Arnold’s three 
categories of productive movement forms (primordial, contextual and existential) and with 
game-centred approaches to learning and teaching. We consider such linkages to be on 
particularly thin academic grounds, for Arnold (1979a) makes only one single two sentence 
reference to Heidegger, and as mentioned earlier, Arnold does not acknowledge the usage of 
the conceptual term “being-in-the-world” which originates in Heidegger’s Being and Time or 
even provides a conceptual account of what he means by its use. This is considerably less 
than Arnold’s (1979a) references to other phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty (seven 
references), Husserl and Satre (four references each).  
 
Although, Arnold (1979a, p. 168) goes to great lengths to stress in Chapter 6 (Education, 
Movement and the Curriculum) that his “three dimensions of movement are not mutually 
exclusive” the reality is that each have come to be interpreted and reinterpreted for quite 
different purposes. Ironically, Arnold’s work has led to an intensification of the 
academicisation of physical education (see for example Reid, 1996a, 1996b; Stolz, 2013, 
2014; Brooker & Macdonald, 1995; Macdonald, Kirk & Braiuka, 1999) because the “about” 
dimension tends to disproportionately dominate, particularly in senior schooling and higher 
education programmes. Whereas, the “in” dimension is paid lip-service to – not to mention 
there tends to be a merging of the “through” and “in” dimensions – as it is “not really 
understood” or even fully conceptualised and contextualised, and therefore not fully 
implemented in practice due to the conceptually abstract theories employed (see for example 
Brown, 2013b, p. 23). Interesting enough, rather than an integrated curriculum which is 
progressive (or student-centred) which was Arnold’s main intention in response to a 
traditional-liberal form of education, we are left with clearly demarcated “silos” that operate 
independently from each other in practice. Brown & Penney (2013, p. 40) acknowledge these 
difficulties due to the “lack of clarity of Arnold’s writings” and of how theorisations of his 
work in physical education have often been taken forward in problematic ways with there 
being a particular difficulty with how some of Arnold’s ideas have been enacted in practice. 
Certainly, it begs the question: If Arnold’s work is not really understood or incoherent, why 
persist to advocate for his conceptualisation of physical education? It is worth noting that the 
early trialling of integrated learning and teaching practices often resulted in 
misunderstandings about what was intended (Thorburn, 2007). Although, arguing from a 
Scottish point of view, this is further reinforced by Thorburn (2010) who argues that the 
integration of teaching and learning approaches in physical education have been problematic, 
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particularly for teacher practitioners who are trying to understand how to integrate content 
knowledge in practical experiential leaning environments that are both personally meaningful 
for students and fulfil assessment requirements. Certainly, this is no easy undertaking to bring 
about the successful integration of teaching and learning that is both personally meaningful 
and authentic for students and at the same time completing necessary assessment tasks as part 
of the set curriculum. Hence, why Thorburn (2010) suggests “future research” to ascertain if 
and how this is possible.  
In summary, Arnold’s intention to provide an alternative form of education through 
progressive means turns on his notion of what it means to be person and how we learn has 
clear limitations. For instance, in Chapter 1 (The Person as an Embodied Consciousness) 
Arnold (1979a) borrows heavily from philosophy to argue that as human beings we are 
necessarily embodied and make sense of our world from engaging in the word in a 
meaningful way. Although, this in itself is not problematic, but his attempts to connect his 
philosophical ideas as a means for justifying physical education in the curriculum encounter a 
number of conceptual issues. The notion that knowledge is personal and we construct and 
make-sense from engaging in movement that is meaningful is worth seriously reconsidering. 
These epistemic claims, albeit popular with postmodern and poststructuralist sources (see for 
example Rorty, 1980; Lyotard, 1984) which contend that there is no such thing as objective 
knowledge and truth that is absolute because human beings socially construct their 
knowledge is philosophically controversial and deeply flawed. Not only are we left with a 
form of relativism which is deeply problematic, this line of reasoning leaves us with no way 
of ascertaining what is worth knowing or even a rational criteria in which to compare one 
knowledge claim against another. Furthermore, Arnold makes no mention whether we can all 
share in or engage in the same meaningful movement experiences at the same time or 
whether meaningful movement experience A is far superior educationally than say 
meaningful movement experience B, and so on. Obviously, this raises a number of rather 
awkward philosophical questions that range from: If I’m engaging in movement activity X, 
does this mean that it will always be meaningful for the agent in question? If agent A engages 
in activity X which is meaningful, will agent B who engages in the same activity have the 
same meaningful experience as say agent A?  Undeniably, the notion of personalisation and 
choice as curriculum principles are notoriously difficult to put into practice – not to mention 
educationally restrictive – as evident by the limitations of multi-activity programmes. 
Consequently, it is only by questioning a number of the complex strands of Arnold’s work 
that greater clarity and purpose can emerge. This it is argued will be particularly beneficial in 
terms of providing clarity on aim or aims statements in physical education, which in turn can 
secure greater policy coherence and practice gains. 
Some future considerations and concluding comments  
This paper, through deploying a genealogical analysis approach, has sought to interrogate the 
educational coherence of Peter Arnold’s conceptual account of meaning in movement, sport 
and physical education. In undertaking this task, we have tried to recognise the contribution 
of Arnold in scoping out the benefits of experience and movement during a time when 
academically-inclined curriculum arrangements were in vogue. In saying this, our 
genealogical analysis of Arnold’s work led us to question a number of fundamental issues 
around both his engagement with progressive ideals in education and phenomenological-
informed interest in personal meaning in movement. For instance, the weakness with 
Dewey’s progressive education focus on using contemporary contexts as the stimulus for 
learning – rather than engaging with more abstract knowledge – are evident in Arnold’s 
account of “learning about”, where the knowledge and understanding contexts that might 
connect types of physical activity with a rational form of inquiry are insufficiently detailed. 
We consider that this lack of connectivity is likely to lead to curriculum arrangements where 
making judgements about curriculum content are difficult as there is no developed basis for 
ruling learning contexts “in” or “out” (see for example Carr, 1998). This situation might 
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result in the most undemanding of all models of learning and teaching – the multi-activity 
model (Ennis, 2013) being continued within schools. Furthermore, Arnold’s highly complex 
holistic learning intentions – based as they are on a somewhat scattered and selective reading 
of phenomenology and existentialism – have resulted in pedagogical difficulties for teachers 
from the outset (Thorburn, 2010). Thus, quite why academics (e.g., Brown & Penney, 2013) 
and policy makers (e.g., Queensland Studies Authority, 2010; Australian Curriculum, 
Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2012) have over such a long period to emphasise,  
rather than further develop Arnold-related ideas is of concern. We consider that it is vital in 
the future that theory serves practice, and practice serves and informs theory better than is the 
case at present (see for example, Stolz & Pill, 2014a, 2014b). As such, we intend in future 
papers to outline in more detail future possibilities for theory and practice in physical 
education and sport pedagogy.  
Notes 
1. These scholarly interviews will be published in two parts by Stolz and Kirk in the academic journal Asia-
Pacific Journal of Health, Sport and Physical Education.  
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